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Abstract: This paper provides a critique of governmentally inspired accounts of 
urban regeneration and partnership working. Drawing on the work of Norbert Elias 
and prominent figurational sociologists, it discusses the changes taking place within 
and through the many partnerships set up by New Labour around the notion of 
Ôcommunity safetyÕ. Whilst recognising the important insights provided by accounts of 
urban regeneration emerging through studies of governmentality, the paper argues 
that such accounts fail to adequately consider the impact of partnership working on 
the individuals, communities and organisations involved. Although urban 
regeneration partnerships have the potential to be the motor of the civilising process 
in the manner identified by figurational sociologists, the paper concludes that they 
are not currently living up to this civilising potential. Key words: civilising process; 
community safety; Elias; Foucault; governmentality; partnership working; urban 
regeneration 
 
Introduction  
 
Over the last 35 years the restructuring of British society in line with the demands of 
neo liberalism has been mirrored in the individualisation of social welfare. The 
changing focus of policy has been increasingly channelled through partnership 
working and governance strategies based on urban regeneration. Although 
partnerships were a feature of urban regeneration throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
their use increased significantly from the middle of the 1990s when over 900 Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) partnerships emerged at the neighbourhood level under 
consecutive Conservative administrations. This process intensified greatly from 1997 
onwards when Tony BlairÕs first New Labour government introduced around 60 new 
partnership arrangements at the sub-national level, a development that resulted in 
around 5500 new local partnerships overall (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002).  
 
Throughout this period, governmentality studies influenced by the work of Michel 
Foucault (1979) have become the dominant theoretical framework for understanding 
these developments. In opposition to traditional accounts based on the centrality of 
an all-powerful state, Foucault (1979) puts forward a view of government as a set of 
governmentalized practices! To illustrate the process involved he coined the notion of 
governmentality, which he uses to demonstrate how, under conditions of liberalism, 
the state reconciles its need to govern with the personal liberty, choice and moral 
autonomy of individuals. A wider understanding of governmentality was developed by 
Rose and Miller (1992) to account for the rise of neo liberalism. Much like Foucault, 
they claim that expertise and knowledge are central features of governmentality, 
primarily because knowledge coordinates and secondly because experts form nodes 
around which issues and explanations can be organised. Government, on the other 
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hand, establishes the rules, frameworks and Ôcentres of calculationÕ necessary to 
govern Ôat a distanceÕ (Rose and Miller 1992).  
 
While the appeal to freedom under classical liberalism was made through a form of 
economic rationalism that allowed economic actors to pursue their own best 
interests, Dean (1999, p. 196) claims that today it is made because security is seen 
to depend Ôon the constitution of individuals, professionals, communities, 
organisations and institutions as sites for the exercise of a Ôresponsible autonomyÕÕ. 
Urban regeneration partnerships are clearly subject to strategies of governmentality 
in this sense. They are the mechanism through which new forms of expertise have 
been aligned with strategies of responsibilisation in individuals, communities and 
organisations in order to develop the forms of self control and self management 
thought necessary to facilitate institutional change and govern urban life effectively. 
Many accounts of these developments (Cruikshank 1999; Schofield 2002) stress the 
centrality of ÔempowermentÕ as a way of cultivating particular forms of subjectivity by 
encouraging the involvement of vulnerable groups in the provision of public services, 
thus transforming them into Ôself-sufficient, active, productive, and participatory 
citizensÕ (Cruikshank 1994, 35). Many stress the centrality of ÔmanagerialismÕ as way 
of bringing about change in this context (Schofield 2002; Kurunmaki and Miller 
2006). In an analysis of an SRB partnership Schofield (2002) claims that 
ÔmanagerialismÕ is used to actively construct and mobilise the Ôdiscourse of 
communityÕ in order to make it conducive to the political aims of government. 
Kurunmaki and Miller (2006) argue similarly that the emergence of private sector 
management techniques in the public sector Ð they refer to hybrid forms of expertise 
and calculating selves Ð are part of a wider attempt to bring improvements in the 
delivery of public services through partnership working. The overall aim, they claim, 
is to link Ôpolitical and ethical objectives with service deliveryÕ in order to Ôestablish 
the legitimacy of particular ways of delivering services and organizing social lifeÕ 
(Kurunmaki and Miller 2006, p. 89). 
 
As is clear from this brief expos, all such accounts draw attention to the 
governmental practices through which political power is realised, thus allowing neo-
liberalism to be read not simply as an ideology or a political philosophy, but as an 
assemblage of techniques and technologies that facilitate the process of governing. 
The force of the analysis comes from the idea that government is based on a 
coordinated and relatively stable ensemble of miscellaneous political projects, 
individual strategies, and social institutions formed by the disciplined organisation 
and action of free subjects. However, while such accounts provide important insights 
into the inner workings of urban regeneration partnerships, this paper argues that 
they do little more that emphasise the institutional workings of power irrespective of 
the conscious subjects who act out their reality. Although they highlight the ways in 
which individuals can act and make choices within specific institutional regimes, I 
argue that such accounts overlook the way in which the individuals, communities and 
organisations involved are compelled to adopt new individualised forms of self 
management and self control that undermine the wider success of urban 
regeneration strategies. To illustrate these arguments the paper draws on Norbert 
EliasÕs (1983; 2000; first published 1939) account of the European civilising process, 
which it compliments with the work of other prominent figurational sociologists. 
 
The paper starts off by examining the foundations of figurational sociology in order to 
develop a strategy to explore the changes taking place through urban regeneration 
partnerships in greater detail. While such partnerships have the potential to be the 
motor of the civilising process, I argue that this potential is currently being 
undermined by an institutional framework that hinders the ability of those working in 
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partnership to make choices in a way that addresses the problems urban areas face. 
To illustrate these arguments the paper draws on research examining urban 
regeneration and partnership working in Bristol in the field of community safety 
(Lever 2008). Emerging as a concern of public policy during the early 1980s, from 
what was previously called Ôlocal crime preventionÕ, community safety was primarily 
seen as a way of developing ÔresponsibleÕ individuals in the Ôdisadvantaged 
communitiesÕ targeted by urban regeneration strategies (Hughes and Edwards 2002), 
and it is therefore a clear example of governmentality in action. The paper focuses on 
one aspect of urban regeneration policy been channelled through the community 
safety route Ð the attempt to increase the number of ÔproblematicÕ drug misusers in 
treatment in order to address the demands of the National Drugs Strategy (Home 
Office 1998; 2002). This narrow focus is necessary to illustrate the impact of urban 
regeneration partnerships on the individuals, communities and organisations 
involved. The final sections of the paper develop the figurational critique of 
governmentality through an examination of the impact of urban regeneration 
strategies on the trajectory of the civilising process. 
 
The process of civilisation 
 
In a similar vein to Foucault, Elias identified a transformation in human interaction 
and psychology Ð alongside the rise of the modern bourgeois state Ð towards a more 
self-disciplined mode of human conduct. However, while Foucault Ð like Weber before 
him Ð looked at cultural and ideological changes, the actions of influential groups and 
individuals, and the emergence of particular modes of socially and historically distinct 
forms of organisation, Elias set out to explore these phenomena as the effects of 
changing social relations, as this led to an understanding, he believed, of why forms 
of life change (Elias 2000). 
 
Elias starts off his analysis of the European civilising process in his work Court 
Society (1983), where he shows how the growth of human interdependencies around 
Royal Courts from the late Middle-Ages onwards had a profound impact on the 
behavioural characteristics of competing social groups. As rising bourgeois groups 
adopted the etiquette of the court aristocracy in their pursuit of social status and 
prestige, Elias shows that the habits of the aristocracy repeatedly lost their function 
as a means of social distinction and differentiation, a situation which meant they had 
to further refine their manners and so on ad finitum. Although both groups prioritised 
the long term over momentary affects, Elias clams that the rationality of the 
professional-bourgeois was more concerned with financial gain (economic capital) 
than the status and prestige claims (symbolic capital) privileged by the Aristocracy 
(van Krieken 1998). The forms of behaviour regarded as ÔirrationalÕ by the Protestant 
bourgeois were, he argues, highly regarded in court society because it was important 
to exhibit oneÕs status if one was to retain oneÕs position at the court. Affective 
outbursts were extremely problematical, not only because they exposed a personÕs 
inner state, but because they broke the etiquette on which court society stood. The 
tension between authenticity and instrumentalism was a central feature of court life 
and Elias argues that any display of authenticity was usually followed by a fall from 
grace. The affective management of oneÕs emotions was, he claims, the primary way 
of maintaining ones position at court and putting in their place those who did not 
know their place. Meetings were a central feature of court life and to maintain their 
social standing courtiers had to meet on set days at set places to carry out set tasks. 
Although they complained bitterly about these rituals, courtiers carried them out in 
the manner expected, as they knew that even the Ôslightest modification of ritualÕ 
would be interpreted Ôas an attempt to upset the shaky social power balanceÕ (van 
Vree 1997, p. 278). 
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As the prestige and status claims of regional nobleman were enhanced by their 
mutual interdependence at court, Elias argues that the dominant codes of etiquette 
on which court society stood slowly spread out through the regions, and how, as a 
consequence, the central courts began to monopolise and pacify larger geographical 
areas. He discusses these developments at great length in The Civilising Process 
(Elias 2000), where he shows how the civilised code of behaviour that emerged in 
court society became ever more widely adopted through processes of state 
formation. In much the same way that he describes how civilit became a central 
feature of court society because of increases in the pressures individuals exerted on 
each other at court, so Elias argues here that the increasing density of social 
relations during modernity had a profound impact on the psychological and emotional 
make up of the individual. These pressures are as relevant to the expression of 
violence and aggression Ð increasingly controlled in line with the monopolization of 
violence and taxation by the state Ð as they are for the emotions and bodily 
functions, as each individual requires increasingly more foresight and self-restraint to 
deal with the cognitive and emotive demands generated.  
 
The civilising process is ambivalent in the extreme, and as contrasts between 
individuals and groups diminished as the civilising process advanced, so increasing 
varieties of civilised conduct emerged as individuals looked for new ways of 
differentiating themselves form each other. These developments are most evident in 
EliasÕs discussions on manners, where he demonstrates how changing attitudes and 
sensibilities towards a wide range of human practices drove the civilising process 
forward. Complex societies are always characterised, Elias (2000, p. 322) argues, by 
ambivalent social relations within which individual actions are both Ôadjusted to and 
contrary to each othersÕ. And it is this latent ambivalence, he claims, that molds 
civilised conduct and drives the civilising process forward. As we observe in what 
follows, while the civilising process has continued to exert pressure towards changing 
patterns of self restraint throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries, departures 
from civilised standards are now also more likely to be met by stricter social 
sanctions, such are the expectations individuals now have of each other in 
increasingly complex societies. These changes become clear if we examine the 
changing nature of social welfare provision. 
 
Civilising welfare 
 
De Swaan (1989) discusses the emergence of welfare provision within a historical 
cycle of collectivisation and civilisation. The central idea of his theory of Ôcollective 
actionÕ is that self-enforcing agreement emerges voluntarily without coercion as the 
external effects of interdependence (i.e. poverty, disorder, crime, illness and disease) 
are more widely recognized by elites. De SwaanÕs work illustrates how, as a greater 
awareness of the consequences of interdependency emerged as industrialisation and 
urbanisation advanced, exclusive forms of urban management that blamed the poor 
for their own misfortune were slowly replaced by more inclusive urban policies.  
 
Much like Rose and Miller (1992), de Swaan claims that concerns about a range of 
issues are best understood as the alignment of individual and group concerns through 
which everyday lives are organised. This does not mean, however, that the outcome 
of 19th urban policy was simply a consequence of top-down governmental strategies 
as many Foucauldians claim, more that it was a process of interaction, contest and 
collaboration between the parties involved. While experts may have taken the 
initiative on some occasions, implementing specific policy interventions, de Swaan 
claims that there was always a degree of complicity or collusion between the parties 
involved. The importance of these developments in second half of the 20th century 
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can not be overstated, and de Swaan (1989) argues that the links between the 
groups involved in welfare regimes and the state apparatus was only surpassed by 
the influence these groups established over the wider population. The advance of the 
civilising process during this period has been explored most thoroughly through the 
Ôinformalisation thesisÕ of Wouters (1977), and an analysis that demonstrates how, as 
explicit social rules and regulations started to lose their significance in the face of 
greater social mixing and changing standards of etiquette, so attitudes towards a 
whole range of issues appeared to relax. While de Swaan (1990) agrees with Wouters 
that there was a decline in the relevance of formal rules and regulations as these 
processes advanced, he claims that the new variations in behaviour that emerged are 
only acceptable through negotiation and mutual consent. He discusses what he calls 
the move away from relational and emotional Ômanagement by commandÕ towards 
Ômanagement by negotiationÕ in a number of different contexts, illustrating how 
people in adjacent organisational ranks, for example, including those in local 
authoritiesÕ and participatory neighbourhood groups must Ð although they have 
gained more room for manoeuvre than they had previously Ð still cede to the 
demands of more powerful in many instances.  
 
Although the distance between governments and the governed lessened during the 
course of the 20th century, de Swaan (1989) points out that the number of 
organisational ranks in the state apparatus simultaneously expanded, thus increasing 
the pressures on those working within welfare regimes in a highly ambivalent way. 
Up to the 1980s, he claims that social relations that accompanied this process had a 
twofold impact on social life. On the one hand, management by command declined 
substantially as management by negotiation was carried over into family life by a 
range of middle class workers (often women) who became arbiters of contemporary 
lifestyles and opinions. On the other hand, a large proportion of this new 
professional-managerial class became clients of schools, health care organisations, 
and social services, thus pushing the civilising process forward through 
professionalised meeting regimes in various welfare contexts (see also van Vree 
1997). From 1980s, however, as the state began to pull back on its welfare 
commitments, de Swaan (1989) claims that the prevailing alignment between 
collectivisation and civilisation within these regimes began to slow down. 
 
Welfare retrenchment, urban regeneration and partnership working 
 
As the relevance of formal rules and regulation declined during the late 20th century, 
and individuals were released from traditional forms of authority and control, 
Wouters claims (1999) that temptation began to increase as things once forbidden 
absolutely became exciting, dangerous and possible. It was during this period, as 
increasing numbers of people began to give in to temptation, and certain crimes 
began to increase, that civilised attitudes towards poverty amongst the middle 
classes began to decline as new commercial attitudes and a more ego-integrated self 
began to emerge (Garland 2000; Kilminster 1998). Wouters (1999) claims that this 
process of reformalisation came to a head during the 1980s when, as the enterprise 
culture boomed, and outbreaks of public disorder began to increase, identification 
with the deprived Ð which had reached its zenith during the 1960s Ð was replaced by 
new forms of identification with the establishment. It was no longer acceptable, he 
argues, or beneficial, to align oneself sympathetically with the poor and vulnerable.  
 
As individualisation of social welfare intensified on the back of these developments 
throughout the 1980s (van Rees 1991), the relative isolation of the lower social 
strata in relation to what is going on around them also began to increase (Elias 
1991). While there may have been an expansion of the civilising process in an 
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upward direction, as interdependency chains lengthened, it has thus also been 
argued that decivilising trends have come to the fore in a downward direction, 
particularly in urban areas, where interdependency chains have fragmented (Fletcher 
1997; Wacquant 2004). This does not mean, however, that civilising processes Ôgo 
backwards, as it were, down the path along which they have already travelledÕ 
(Fletcher 1997, p. 84). It is more that they may be partial trends within the wider 
development of a civilising process itself. De Swaan (2001, p. 3) emphasises the 
point well when he suggests that the Ômonopolisation of violence by the state may 
result in the overall civilisation of society and yet, in certain cases, these civilised 
canons may nevertheless exclude certain categories of citizens from protectionÕ.  
 
Despite the process of strategic decentralisation that has accompanied the 
individualisation of social welfare over recent decades, the number of organisational 
ranks in the state apparatus has continued to expand as urban regeneration and 
partnership working have emerged as solutions to these decivilising trends. Meetings 
have become a central feature of these developments on a number of levels, and 
much as courtiers had to learn the rules of meetings at the court of Louis XIV during 
the 17th century, so a wide range of professionals and neighbourhood groups are 
having to learn the ÔÔrulesÕ of meetings in order to participate effectively in 
collaborative activitiesÕ (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, p. 183). I have argued 
elsewhere (Lever 2005) that van VreeÕs (1997) work on meeting regimes is a useful 
starting point for a figurational analysis of urban regeneration in this sense, not least 
because the partnerships involved are essentially inter and intra organisational 
meeting regimes that bring individuals from different backgrounds together in ways 
that have the potential to be the motor of the civilising process.  
 
As these developments have intensified the politics of place has also emerged as a 
central feature of regeneration policy (Amin 2005). In the field of community safety, 
it was expected that local authority wide Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(CDRPs) would cut across the hierarchies of the state in ways that allowed 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods to draw on funds to improve the delivery of public 
services and address the problems they face. However, while many of the initiatives 
being channeled through CDRPs now reflect the fragmentation and pluralisation of 
society, they are also the foundations on which New LabourÕs common approach to 
controlling behaviour stands (Crawford 2003). This situation can be seen in the case 
study of community safety presented below, where BristolÕs CDRP uses very different 
strategies to engage neighbourhood partnerships in the inner city and on outlying 
estates, but where the overall outcome of policy is very much the same. While 
management by negotiation remains a feature these developments on a number of 
levels, it is clear from the material presented that it is has become increasingly more 
difficult for those working in the new institutional regimes emerging around the 
notion of community safety to act and make choices in the way envisaged by 
governmentality theorists, and that this process often undermines the wider 
trajectory of the civilising process.  
 
Urban regeneration and community safety in Bristol 
 
In Bristol, New LabourÕs institutional reforms facilitated the emergence of various 
urban regeneration initiatives. By 2002, on top of the eight SRB regeneration 
schemes in operation, Bristol had two Education Action Zones, two Sure Start 
Programmes, two European Urban Programmes, 10 Neighbourhood Renewal areas, a 
New Deal for Communities partnership, and 17 citywide partnerships, including a 
rapidly expanding CDRP Ð Safer Bristol (Stewart 2003).  
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The brief for the doctoral research on which this paper draws Ð which was jointly 
funded by the ESRC and the former ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) Ð 
required the recipient to examine the ways in which Government funding was being 
realigned through partnership working in order to overcome the failure of previous 
regeneration initiatives and improve the delivery of public services. The recipient had 
the freedom to examine these developments in a policy area of their choice; 
community safety was chosen because: 1) it was an area where government funding 
was being realigned in very particular ways, and: 2) it was a clear example of why 
urban regeneration partnerships had emerged in the first place, i.e. community 
breakdown. A single case study was chosen because of the perceived need to 
examine how the politics of community safety evolved across different spheres of 
governing (Edwards 2002). As a result of these factors the research set out to 
explore how, to what extent and why government resources were being realigned 
through partnership working in order to improve community safety in Bristol. The 
case study, which took place during 2005 and 2006, used semi structured interviews 
with partnership managers at the regional, city and neighbourhood levels, which 
were complimented with observations made at partnership meetings.  
 
Partnership working at the regional and city level 
 
The research started off by examining partnership working at the regional level. At 
the time there was strong political pressure to align the crime and drugs functions at 
the Government Office of the South West (GOSW) with NHS (health based) agencies 
in order to increase the number of ÔproblematicÕ drug misusers in treatment. At the 
local authority level, Safer Bristol was simultaneously overseeing a range of targets 
linked to the crime and disorder reduction agenda, the national drugs strategy, and a 
range of government initiatives, including the Drug Interventions Programme (DIP) 
and the Prolific and Priority Offenders Programme (PPOP). In line with BristolÕs Crime 
and Drugs Strategy (BCC 2005), these developments were also mirrored at the 
neighbourhood level, where the cityÕs Neighbourhood Renewal Partnerships were 
developing their own projects and initiatives in the hope of attracting funding to 
address local crime, health and drug related problems.  
 
It soon became clear that Safer Bristol was the central player in the new institutional 
architecture that was emerging around the notion of community safety. One of the 
partnerships primary tasks has been to bring together the resources of agencies at 
the city level in order to improve the delivery of public services in the cityÕs 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This has been no easy task, and on almost all 
occasions Safer Bristol has been compelled by managerial pressure to redirect 
funding towards the Government programmes and strategies outline above. A 
number of the Government programmes overseen by Safer Bristol were also linked to 
the Pooled Treatment Budget, which emerged as a result of the new joined up 
approach to public health initiated through Section 31 of the Health Act 1999. A 
disparate number of agencies contribute funds to the budget, which has to deliver 
the treatment agenda in the city for all drug misusers, regardless of whether they are 
offenders or not. Not surprisingly, there have been many passionate debates 
between criminal justice and non-criminal justice agencies about who gets priority 
access to the limited pool of resources that are available and, therefore, about who 
receives treatment first.  
 
By late 2005, drug treatment provision in the city was becoming increasingly 
prominent as a result of the work done by Safer BristolÕs Drug Action Team and the 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) Social Inclusion Team, who had been targeting vulnerable 
groups (rough sleepers, beggars, and drug misusers) across the city for a number of 
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years. The PCT team had achieved a star rating for achieving its targets and 
increasing the number of people in treatment. An interviewee highlighted the 
importance of these developments for furthering BristolÕs community safety agenda, 
claiming that if the team had to keep increasing the number of people in treatment to 
be successful then that is what it would have to do. However, it appeared that the 
team was a victim of its own success; if it increased the number of people in 
treatment the team would receive more funding to develop new services, but it would 
be unable to cope with the demands its success had generated. If it failed to get 
more people into treatment it would be seen as a failure and penalised with even 
more stringent targets and demands. A respondent explained the possible 
consequences of these developments in the following way: 
 
I have real concerns about capacity for the system in the future because 
we have got such high numbers of people in treatment, and weÕve got 
more people expected to come in because weÕve got extra money for this 
that and the other (Interview with Primary Care Trust Manager 2005). 
 
This situation had not been helped by the demands of the DIP, which required 
individuals coming through criminal justice interventions to be seen more quickly 
than those emerging through community referrals. A respondent from the Police 
highlighted the problems this situation creates on a number of levels, arguing that 
the system was effectively penalising people who self-presented through community 
based agencies. As the interviewee pointed out: ÔItÕs bloody difficult for them to get 
in and get treatment and support at that stage, they almost have to come into the 
criminal justice systemÕ to receive help. Moreover, stressing the question the Police 
always ask themselves when they have to make a decision about reallocating funds 
towards this type of initiative, the respondent emphasised the answer that is always 
given: ÔIf we donÕt get measured on it, why are we doing itÕ (Interview with Police 
Superintendent 2006).  
 
Other agencies were in a similar situation. The Avon and Somerset Probation Service 
had been involved with the PPOP with the Police since 2002. There was a clear 
crossover between the DIP and the PPOP and there was a shared objective to reduce 
drug related offending by diverting problematic dug misusers into treatment. Initially 
Probation had around £! million a year from central government to deliver its work 
on PPOP, but with funding due to expire late in 2005 it was expected that they would 
continue to fund their involvement in the programme from their core funding stream. 
This had not been possible without making cutbacks elsewhere, and probation had 
been forced to pull back on their pooled treatment budget commitment. In many 
ways the service was in a similar position to the PCT team. Even if they met the 
targets set for them in the manner expected, and pushed the required number of 
people into treatment, they knew they did not have the capacity or resources to deal 
with these developments effectively.  
 
Safer Bristol managerÕs often stressed the benefits of partnership working in this type 
of situation, arguing that they could hold defaulting agencies to account. An 
Probation Service executive was more sceptical and highlighted a number of issues 
that impinged on the ability of the service to carry out its core obligations effectively, 
not least the pressure to play the partnership game in Safer BristolÕs (sic  New 
LabourÕs) terms. Being held to account at a meeting of the Safer Bristol executive Ð 
which was attended by senior managers from all the major government agencies in 
the city Ð was clearly humiliating for the individual concerned, who explained the 
process involved in the following way: 
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[The] thing that happens is you put funding into something for two or 
three years but you donÕt have the funding to continue beyond that 
period of time É [and] É then you say to the partner agency that É you 
canÕt continue to fund it [and] É you get the accusation levelled at you 
that youÕre disinvesting in the delivery of that particular service 
(Interview with Probation Service Executive 2006). 
 
It soon became clear through observations made at meetings of the Safer Bristol 
executive that they were not much more than a symbolic exercise, a way of giving 
legitimacy to the workings of the wider regime. Important decisions were often made 
before meetings took place and partner agencies that disagreed with Safer BristolÕs 
agenda in a meeting would be dismissed with polite but firm intent. Time and again, 
the executive dismissed long term solutions in favour of measures that could more 
easily achieve short term reductions in crime and disorder.  
 
As the research progressed, meetings were attended, and informal relationships built, 
the attitudes of Safer Bristol managers began to soften. Beneath the cold exterior on 
public display, there was clearly a concern about the inner workings of the wider 
regime, with many managers expressing the view that targets had become the 
overriding focus of work, almost an end in themselves, and that crime and disorder 
reduction had taken the place of what was once called community safety to the 
detriment of all concerned. As one manager pointed out: 
 
[With the] focus on targets you get self-fulfilling prophecies É the target is 
just an abstraction of a bigger picture and it tends to focus you down on 
this narrow target rather than the big picture of community safety 
(Interview with a Safer Bristol Manager 2006).  
 
Not surprisingly, these developments were also causing problems at the 
neighbourhood level. 
 
Partnership working at the neighbourhood level 
 
Although many neighbourhood partnerships in the city were developing strategies to 
tackle crime, health and drug related problems, it was all but impossible to get 
funding for their initiatives unless they were aligned directly with Safer BristolÕs short 
term crime and disorder reduction agenda. This was problematic for individuals 
working at this level. One neighbourhood manager appeared mystified about what 
was expected of the local partnership and what could be done to carry out the 
requirements of the job effectively, as she explained in the following way: 
 
IÕm pressurised from above and IÕm pressurised from below, and I canÕt 
make a decision on anything because IÕm not allowed to have a view on 
anything (Interview with Neighbourhood Partnership Manager 2005). 
 
This type of response was common in neighbourhoods where the local strategy was 
opposed to Safer BristolÕs agenda. This was often the case in the inner city, where 
neighbourhood partnerships had developed long term strategies to improve 
community safety through employment, education and health related initiatives. 
 
When a local strategy was aligned with Safer Bristol Ð which was sometimes the case 
on outer lying estates where problems were less complex Ð the pressures could be 
very different. In this type of situation ÔsuccessfulÕ managers were often cajoled and 
coerced to work with Safer BristolÕs core team to roll out the crime and disorder 
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reduction agenda more widely, often to the detriment of the plans and strategies of 
the inner city neighbourhoods outlined above. Another neighbourhood manager 
explained: 
 
In a way itÕs like you can have what you want but only through Safer 
Bristol, and itÕs difficult for me to disagree with that because I want to 
keep my job, and keep the good work weÕve been doing and share some 
of that good work with other communities, but we may not be so 
welcome in other communities (Interview with Neighbourhood 
Partnership Manager 2006).  
 
While many neighbourhood managers clearly recognised the pressure Safer Bristol 
was under to deliver on the targets coming down from central government, they 
were clearly uneasy about the new ways of working that were emerging.  
 
These feelings of unease turned into open confrontation when a neighbourhood 
partnership in the inner city discovered that Safer Bristol had applied for planning 
permission to build a new drug treatment centre in the area to accommodate the 
increasing number of people requiring treatment. Things came to a head in 2006 
when Safer Bristol withdrew funding for a number of community-based drugs 
projects and gave the Bristol Drugs Project (BDP) Ð a citywide voluntary sector drug 
agency Ð a £1.8 million contract to carry through plans that had been left in limbo by 
the refusal of planning permission some months earlier. This caused a great deal of ill 
feeling across the city. Although funding was reinstated at a later date, it was only 
reinstated on limited terms linked directly to Safer Bristol, the concerns of the 
national drugs strategy, and a rapidly expanding BDP.  
 
In the early months of 2006 a regional news bulletin on TV reported that Bristol City 
Council was struggling to house people who had completed one of the new treatment 
programmes introduced by Safer Bristol, such were the numbers involved (BBC 
2006). Many of the individuals concerned were thus being housed together in some 
of the worst housing in the city, often in isolated tower blocks, where they were 
reencountering many of the problems that had forced them onto the streets in the 
first place Ð crime, anti social behaviour, drug misuse, and violence. To make matters 
worse, Safer Bristol preferred to deal with the problems their policies were in part 
perpetuating through the use of initiatives that again forced vulnerable individuals on 
to the streets and into the criminal justice system. 
 
The EmperorÕs new courts 
 
Rodger (2008) argues that the new institutional structures on which these 
developments stand can be equated with what Etzioni (1968) once referred to as 
inauthentic politics, a political process that appears to be responsive but which is 
actually alienating and manipulating. Although it draws on governmentality theory for 
its intellectual rationale, Rodger claims that the governance model developed by New 
Labour under Tony Blair shares this Ôproblem complexÕ in that it constructs actors 
who are able to respond to government stimulation through contractual relations that 
facilitate their involvement in partnership working through what Crawford (2003) 
terms Ôconsent-by-coercionÕ.  
 
In many ways, it appears that partnerships like Safer Bristol are in a similar position 
to the Royal Courts in earlier centuries. As well as playing a coordinating role at the 
local authority level, such a partnership provides a buffer zone between the 
Government and local authorities which protects the Government from any direct 
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responsibility for policy failure. The pressures faced by the individuals working in this 
environment are intense and in much the same way that courtiers were constrained 
by the wider figuration they formed around the King, so the individuals working in 
this institutional regime are constrained by the managerial pressures being 
channelled though Safer Bristol. Although they have developed a clear and 
unambiguous understanding of their relations with the individuals they engage with, 
off the record many Safer Bristol managers expressed concerns about policy 
development. However, in a situation where career prospects and job opportunities 
are clearly dependent on playing the partnership game, many stressed the benefits of 
instrumentalism over and above any claims to authenticity. Much as it was in court 
society, the affective management of emotion is the primary way of maintaining their 
position, the position of Safer Bristol, and putting in their place those who not know 
their place. Much as individuals in court society were ostracized and excluded from 
the wider figuration if they stepped out of line, so the individuals and agencies who 
fail maintain the etiquette on which Safer BristolÕs agenda stands are ostracised and 
excluded. As van Iterson et al (2001) note, to be successful in these complex 
environments individuals need to combine flexibility and friendliness with an ability to 
get results; they must combine a strict sense of discipline with an ability to smile and 
get on with it.  
 
In this context, we could say that management through negotiation paralyses 
rebellion (de Swaan 1990). While it forces individuals to consider the views of others 
more openly, it takes place in a context where some organisations hold all the cards. 
This is clearly evident when one considers the expansion and development of meeting 
regimes over recent decades, for while successful partnership working may well be 
dependent on attendance at a far greater number of meetings than it was previously, 
attendance in itself is no guarantee of success. This is why the forms of 
empowerment highlighted by Foucauldians Ð even if they are to be thought of as 
liberating Ð are so rarely experienced as such by those involved. Despite the many 
claims made about the empowering nature of the contemporary governance 
programmes being channelled through urban regeneration partnerships, there is still 
no guarantee that fair and equal arrangements will emerge. Although the changes 
implemented by New Labour compelled different groups and organisations to speak 
more openly with each about the problems they face, it is clear that some must still 
abandon their demands if they clash with the claims of the more powerful. While 
some organisations have undoubtedly gained a greater degree of movement and 
autonomy than they had previously, it follows that others have undoubtedly lost out.  
 
Perhaps the clearest example of this process is the loss of local government power 
over recent decades and the rise in importance of government agencies and 
neighbourhood groups, for any gains made by one have often been counterbalanced 
by the demands placed on them by others. While partnerships like Safer Bristol may 
have gained more freedom of movement vis--vis central government than the 
decentralised units that preceded them, they have also become more interdependent 
on a number of levels. While in earlier periods these processes had a wider civilising 
impact, they are now being reversed as the pressures cascading down from central 
Government through the crime and disorder reduction agenda exert their wider 
influence. 
 
 
The reproblematisation of society 
 
Crawford (2006, p. 470) claims that the attempt to transform contemporary British 
life through the imposition of formal rules and regulations is problematic, not least 
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because it entails Ôan acute dangerÕ of over heightening sensitivities Ôabout young 
people, crime and anti social behaviourÕ. A respondent from Bristol Social Services 
argued similarly that the development of the new drugs industry was nothing more 
than a moral panic through which concerns over drugs related problems were being 
overemphasised for political reasons. The new industry was seen to be extremely 
problematical, not only because of Ôthe pressure it places on agenciesÕ, but because it 
also Ôcriminalises and worries young peopleÕ over things they have no control over 
(Interview with Social Services Health Manager 2005).  
 
Van Krieken (2003) refers to these developments as the reproblematisation of 
society, and he is clear that they can be seen as markers of a slow down in the 
civilising process and of an increase in disidentification across society more generally. 
He claims that: 
 
The greater emphasis on the study of governance rather than human 
beings and the social life being governed has generated a relative 
inability to engage with what remains a central feature of those 
developments: the apparent disruption of an overall long term trend 
towards the increasing pacification of social life (van Krieken 2003, p. 2: 
emphasis in original). 
 
He suggests further these developments are a direct outcome of specific attempts to 
deal with lengthening of chains of interdependency, and further that an important 
aspect of the new punitiveness embodied in these developments emerges from the 
increased expectations individuals now have of each other. The title of a book 
published in 2005 Ð Making People Behave (Burney 2005) Ð puts this phase of policy 
development in perspective, and it is clear from what has been said that since 1997 
Ôthe state has embarked upon nothing less the attempted transformation of 
contemporary British mannersÕ (Atkinson et al 2006, p. 44).  
 
From a figurational perspective there are two ways of looking at these developments. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that the targeting of ÔproblematicÕ individuals 
over and above the concerns of disadvantaged neighbourhoods became New LabourÕs 
poisoned chalice Ð a problem of Gordian complexity Ð and that however hard they 
searched for solutions to the problems at hand, the more such problems appeared to 
grow; this would be a clear vindication of EliasÕs insistence on the importance of 
unintended social change. On the other hand, it could be argued that these 
developments were the intentional outcome of New Labour policy, of an attempt to 
demonstrate that they were in control of the crime problem; and on this account it 
could be argued that New Labour at least created an institutional framework through 
which partnership working Ð defined in terms of crime and disorder reduction Ð could 
succeed. Either way, it is clear that New LabourÕs approach to community safety was 
problematic, not least because social manners are illustrative of the ways in which 
individuals relate to one another within social space; they are the psychological and 
emotional structures that express the appropriate way of behaving in the company of 
others, and they cannot, therefore, as many policy makers tend to assume, be 
imposed from the outside through the use of formal rules and regulations; they must 
be encouraged from within through polices that help individuals to articulate their 
experiences and manage their expectations of each other in an open and inclusive 
way. As Elias pointed out, the crucial determinant of the civilising process is the self-
compulsion individualÕs exert on themselves when assessing the possible 
consequences of their actions.  
 
Concluding discussion 
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Much like accounts inspired by the work of Foucault, the figurational account 
presented in this paper focuses on the forms of subjectivity that emerge within the 
institutional regimes emerging around urban regeneration partnerships. But whereas 
Foucauldians focus on the ways in which the plural Ôarts of governmentÕ construct 
different discourses of subjectivity across historical different periods, a figurational 
account focuses on the way in which diverse forms of subjectivity emerge within 
fluctuating networks of social and political interdependence. There is no 
straightforward relationship between governmental strategies and specific ethical and 
political outcomes as there is for governmentality theorists. Shifts in the personality 
structure are a consequence of the growth or decline of human interdependencies, 
and although power works Ð much as it does for Foucault Ð as an anonymous force to 
shape social relations and notions of self, there is a more dialectical relationship 
between the specific patterning of social and organisational relations and the forms of 
subjectivity they produce in individual actors, both inside and outside institutional 
regimes. 
 
While the civilising process has continued to exert pressure towards a rise in the 
moral standard Ð as evidenced by the necessity to develop policies based on higher 
levels of mutual consent and negotiation Ð the other side of the coin is highlighted by 
the fact that departures from civilised standards are now more likely to be met by 
stricter social sanctions. We have seen how, if individuals fail to maintain the 
etiquette on which Safer BristolÕs wider regime stands, they are held to account by 
the central executive, and further how formal rules and regulations cascading down 
from central government determine the modes and forms of life that are emerging in 
wider society. It is clear that urban regeneration partnerships have the potential to 
be the motor of the civilising process, but it is only when the external effects of 
interdependence create the demand for more inclusive urban policies, much as they 
did in earlier centuries, that the potential in this mode of governing will be realised.  
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